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Abstract 
James Buchanan Cooper, Jr.: Children’s Practice of the Social Construction of Scientific 
Fact: A Meta-Ethnographic Synthesis 
(Under the direction of George Noblit) 
 
Science education researchers have attempted descriptions of the relationship between 
science studies and science education. Such descriptions have applied the aggregate logic of 
literature reviews to the interpretive works of sociologists and anthropologists. Meta-
ethnography (Noblit & Hare, 1988) provides a framework for the synthesis of interpretive 
studies which may be more appropriate to describing the relationship between science 
education and science and technology studies. This project attempts to articulate that 
relationship further using Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life, a seminal work in science 
studies, and Barton’s Teaching Science For Social Justice, a study of the scientific practice 
of youth who live in homeless shelters. The meta-ethnographic synthesis reveals that the 
relationship between the two communities of scientific practice and the knowledge they use 
and produce does much to determine the form of that practice. 
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Introduction 
Two Related Notions of Authenticity in Science Education 
 Science educators and science education researchers are faced with the dual task of 
finding a way to make science instruction accurate and inclusive. Both the accuracy and 
inclusiveness of such instruction can be viewed in terms of its authenticity. Recent science 
reform documents advocating the opportunity for all students to attain a high level of 
scientific literacy call for a combination of classroom experience similar to the work of 
professional scientists and the simultaneous provision of activity that it meaningful for all 
student. The National Science Education Standards (1996) describe “inquiry into authentic 
questions generated from student experiences” as “the central strategy for teaching science.” 
(p. 31) Inquiry has a two-fold definition, one which is comprised of the ways in which 
scientists study the world and provide evidence-based explanations of their findings. For 
students, inquiry is a set of activities through which they learn both “scientific ideas,” and 
“how scientists study the natural world.” (p. 23) The distinction between scientists and 
students is later collapsed as inquiry is redefined as “a set of interrelated processes by which 
scientists and students acquire knowledge and develop a rich understanding of concepts, 
principles, models and theories.” (p. 214) Thus, the initial juxtaposition of scientists and 
students implies a comparison between the activities of the two while the later collapsed 
definition makes possible a two-fold concept of authenticity in science education. First, the 
questions on which those inquiry processes are focused ought to be authentic inasmuch as 
they are derivative of student interests, knowledge and skills. Second, as defined by the 
2Standards, inquiry implies that the processes students use to acquire knowledge and 
conceptual understanding ought to be authentic inasmuch as they are 
processes shared with professional scientists.  
Other science education reform advocates (Roth and Barton, 2004) have described a 
vision of scientific literacy for school students that would allow them to be intelligent 
consumers of the products of professional science and allow them to be capable of engaging 
in informed and intelligent discourse related to scientific issues of particular global and local 
importance such as water quality and the fate of the urban environment. This form of 
scientific literacy implies a synthesis of science learning that is authentic in both of the ways 
described above. The inquiry learning that takes place in science classrooms should lead to 
scientific literacy that reflects back on the student backgrounds from which its authentic 
questions were to have been drawn. Students who learn to practice science in this way will 
have constructed an understanding of the relationship between their lives in their local 
communities and science as it is practiced by professionals both in laboratories and the field. 
Social Studies of Science as a view into the Authentic Practice of Scientists 
 Over the course of the last three decades, numerous scholars have engaged in research 
informed by the philosophy, history and sociology of science, collectively considered to be 
either science studies or science and technology studies. For purposes of this work, the term 
science studies will be used in order avoid confusion with the Science-Technology-Society 
reform of the 1980s and 1990s. Science studies has emerged as its own sub-discipline within 
each of the three more traditional subject areas of history, philosophy and sociology. The 
history and philosophy of science have longstanding relationships with science education, for 
example the influence of Kuhn’s (1996) paradigm shift on the development of a conceptual 
3change theory of science learning (Posner and Strike, 1982) as well as in its ongoing 
consideration of the nature of science (Eflin, Glennan, & Reisch,1999; Smith and 
Scharmann, 1999). The work of historians and philosophers of science is accurately 
categorized as focusing on an idealized, clean version of scientific practice that is not focused 
on the day-to-day work that takes place in laboratories and the field (Roth, 1998).   
The relationship between science education and the sociology of science, particularly 
its ethnographic examinations of communities of science (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; 
Traweek, 1988) is less thoroughly expressed and holds a good deal of potential for additional 
exploration. Studies from this field present interpretive accounts of the life of the laboratory 
in all of its idiosyncratic messiness. Perhaps this is, in part, the image of science that inquiry 
learning hopes to make more common in classrooms but which science educators have begun 
to contemplate only in the last decade. It offers authentic, interpretive images of the practice 
of professional scientists. 
Articulations Already Made Between Science Studies and Science Education 
 Much of the work that has sought to link science studies and science education has 
taken the form of reviews of science studies literature and its implications for the practice of 
science in classrooms. It addresses how the images provided by science studies might make 
the practice of classroom science more similar to that of professional scientists as well as 
how science educators can use its research methods in their own field. An entire issue of 
Research in Science Education was devoted to an exploration of that link. There, two of the 
nine articles were reviews of the literature with implications for practice and methodological 
considerations in science education research. (Costa, Hughes & Pinch, 1998;  Chen and 
Crawford, 1998).  Several authors applied theoretical frames derived from science studies 
4research to work in science education ranging from the construction of science by guidance  
counselors (Larochelle & Desautels, 1998) to a consideration of Latour’s (1987) actor-
network theory as an analytical lens for course construction (Gaskell & Hepburn, 1998).   
Similarly, Roth and McGinn (1997, 1998) identify science and technology studies as 
a potential partner in a cross-disciplinary collaboration with science education. Science 
educators could draw on science and technology studies in four main ways. First, works from 
science studies could be used to teach students a more accurate image of the nature of science 
and scientific practice. Second, science studies have revealed the central importance of visual 
representations or inscriptions in the practice of professional scientists. The previously 
described insight is a potential boon to those science educators charged with designing 
curricula or learning environments. Science studies also utilize an array of research methods 
to examine the work of scientists which science education researchers might consider 
applying to the examination of science learning. Finally, science studies illuminate the 
relationship between a range of research reporting techniques and the theories that undergird 
them, a possible avenue for expanding the ways in which science learners might consider and 
report their own research.  While these insights might improve classroom practice by 
advancing authenticity associated with the imitation of the practice of professional scientists, 
they fail to address the question of improving the access of all students to a meaningful 
practice of science, the form of authenticity explicitly invoked in the National Science 
Education Standards (1996). 
 Cunningham and Helms (1998) specifically identify the sociology of science as a 
tool for the reconceptualization of school science content and pedagogy with greater 
accuracy in expressing the work of professional scientists as a collaborative, democratic 
5enterprise. Such a reconceptualization would serve as a "tool for making science education 
more authentic and more inclusive." It would allow teachers to put a more human face on the 
practice of science by professionals, minimizing the portrayal of science as being strictly a 
very competitive, highly technical endeavor practiced by intelligent but detached white males 
with advanced degrees, far removed from the everyday lives of students' communities. Such 
science pedagogy would emphasize the importance of interaction among experimenters 
through the pooling and evaluation of data or the subdivision of a particular experimental 
task into units designed for completion by a small group. Small group work would also 
facilitate the integration of "cooperative competition" among professional practitioners of 
science as students might work separately to find a best solution to a particular problem. 
 Insights from the sociology of science also raise questions about the sources of 
authority in classroom science (Cunningham and Helms, 1998). The twin sources of 
authority and guidance in school science classrooms are typically teachers and textbooks. A 
practice of science informed by sociology of science could deemphasize the authority of 
those sources, instead providing students with images of scientists who validate their work by 
informing other scientists, raising and discussing questions and difficulties. Students might 
also consult with popular science publications which would serve as a surrogate to the 
refereed journals used by professionals. Diminishing the authority of the teacher and text 
opens the possibility of more peer review of evidence and argument among students 
themselves. 
 However, drawing on work done in science studies runs the risk of limiting the work 
of science educators to mimesis, particularly if the interdisciplinary connections made 
between the two fields is done primarily through literature reviews followed by suggested 
6classroom applications. This narrows both the focus of the classroom practice of inquiry 
processes and its greater goal, scientific literacy. The science classroom risks becoming 
merely a training ground for future science professionals who enter the profession with a 
clearer picture of the work that will occupy them for the duration of their careers. This poses 
a serious problem for students who are not served well by school science as it is currently 
conceptualized, particularly since competence at school related tasks bears little or no 
relation to how competent one is in everyday situations (Roth and Barton, 2002). To describe 
science learning as authentic has often meant to engage in work similar to that done by 
professional scientists in their laboratories. Indeed, science studies have been criticized for a 
lack of focus on field research such as environmental biology (Bowen and Roth, 2000). 
However, if authenticity in science learning is also conceptualized in terms of how inquiry 
driven questions bear on students' everyday activities and community context, then the 
connection between science studies and the work of science educators needs to be articulated 
across a broader range of studies.   
 Many of the descriptions of the potential relationship between science studies and 
science education (Roth and McGinn, 1998,1999; Cunningham and Helms, 1998) are quite 
general in their review of the science studies literature. Time and again, Latour and 
Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1986) is cited, described as a seminal work in the field and held 
up as an influential portrait of the work of laboratory scientists. It would be useful to consider 
Laboratory Life more closely.  In combination with a critical ethnography of a practice of 
science, a work such as Laboratory Life taken from the sociology of science could serve to 
further humanize the professional practice of science, perhaps providing a glimpse of two 
messy practices of science through two diverse interpretive lenses.  
7Such an endeavor is in part a response to two trends in previous research. First, the 
relationship articulated between science studies and science education has been almost 
exclusive in its focus on classroom science as the context for science learning. This is ironic 
in light of the fact that some of the advocates of forging such a relationship also advocate a 
broadening of the idea of scientific literacy. Roth, McGinn & Bowen (1999) draw on Lave's 
(1988) work related to situated cognition and legitimate peripheral participation. The notion 
of legitimate peripheral participation in science education fits comfortably with science 
studies, as students' engagement with scientific experts as peripheral participants would 
likely have to occur outside of the classroom, yet the focus of most of the research linking the 
two fields and applying legitimate peripheral participation have only done so in the context 
of changing classroom practice. Yet there is a body of critical ethnographic work that 
describes and interprets practices of science outside of school, in communities and among 
children for whom science reform efforts are especially relevant. Barton (2003) describes the 
practices of science constructed by groups of children living in homeless shelters in two 
different parts of the U.S. in Teaching Science For Social Justice. This work focuses on how 
and why these children construct a practice of science for themselves outside the context of 
school, yet it also has implications for the reform of science instruction in schools.   
 Second, the explication of the body of science studies research applicable to science 
education has generally taken the form of literature reviews and recommendations for 
practice or the importation of a theoretical frame or method from science studies into science 
education. The first approach does a disservice to the particularities of individual studies 
from science studies by applying a positivistic logic to their interpretivism. While 
generalizations about what science studies have to offer science educators have been show to 
8be useful for designing experimental classroom practices in limited cases (Roth, McGinn & 
Bowen, 1996) and framing reform efforts in different terms (Cunningham and Helms, 1998) 
they buy into a logic that reduces the inherent complexity of interpretive research to 
something that can be aggregated and used as a basis for generalization. Another method of 
relating the two fields is possible. Rather than relying on a review of the literature as a source 
of generalizations or applying a frame from one field to research in the other, meta-
ethnography (Noblit and Hare, 1998) retains the interpretive focus of the endeavor while also 
creating a reciprocal relationship between works from both fields.    
 An Interpretive Synthesis Method for Interpretive Studies 
Noblit and Hare (1988) propose meta-ethnography as an "approach to synthesizing 
understanding from ethnographic accounts" (p. 10).  Eschewing the aggregative logic of 
traditional literature reviews and meta-analyses, meta-ethnography provides an explicitly 
interpretive manner in which to reveal analogies between ethnographic accounts, reducing 
the accounts through the selection of the key metaphors or organizers used by the authors. 
The senses of those reduced accounts are then translated into one another. Whatever 
analogies the translations make clear then form the meta-ethnographic synthesis. Studies 
synthesized using meta-ethnography are generally focused on a similar topic. In this case, the 
two studies being synthesized both portray and examine images of people practicing science. 
A typical literature review might privilege either critical ethnography or science studies by 
creating an aggregate sense of the relevant work in the field, then using that sense as a 
springboard for commentary on the other field. We would learn only what science studies 
have to say to critical ethnographers in science education or what critical ethnographers have 
to say to those working in science studies.   
9Because a meta-ethnography can take the form of a reciprocal translation of the two 
studies into one another, it might reveal what works from both traditions have to say to one 
another as well as producing a synthetic statement of the senses of the two works in 
combination. It is also possible that the metaphors used in one of the two reduced accounts 
might better convey the sense of both of the accounts. A meta-ethnography is emergent 
inasmuch as the translations of studies into one another is accomplished via a "search for 
adequate metaphors to express the studies and their relationships" (Noblit and Hare, 1988, p. 
35). 
 Meta-ethnography was originally conceived not as a way to consider synthesis, but 
interpretation (Thorne, S., Jensen, L., Kearney, M.H., Noblit, G., & Sandelowski, M., 2003). 
It emerged from a theory of interpretation as translation, the idea that ethnography amounts 
to a metaphorical analogy which the ethnographer makes explicit. This becomes necessary 
when ethnographers encounter a situation in which the community in which they are working 
engage in a different practice from one they might expect in a given situation; at that point, a 
comparison/translation into the ethnographer's terms of understanding is necessary so that the 
practice might make sense. Those translations amount to a statement of how a particular 
practice relates to a practice known to the ethnographer. In the case of a meta-ethnography, 
two or more sets of metaphorical translations are evaluated and translated into one another at 
a level of understanding which seems twice removed from the observation of practices 
accomplished by each ethnographer in her/his original study.  
 This poses a particular set of problems for meta-ethnographies like the one attempted 
here, which are aimed at professional practitioners in a particular field. It requires a 
consideration both of the knowledge being synthesized and the audience to whom the 
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synthesis is addressed (Thorne et al., 2003).  One part of this consideration bears on how the 
knowledge being synthesized is situated both with respect to the present and the original 
context in which the study from which it was drawn. This is a question of the degree to 
which the experience from which the knowledge was drawn remains pertinent to the present 
day or how repeatable the history it interprets might be. The second question in considering a 
meta-ethnography intended to influence professional practice is whether the expressed 
synthesis of studies has meaning to both practitioners and those people whose lives they 
affect. 
 In this case it is important to consider how the homeless children, or disenfranchised 
children in general might be able to use the knowledge provided by a meta-ethnography. The 
goal of this particular meta-ethnography is to take the work done in previous literature 
reviews and research connecting science studies to science education in a new direction. 
First, a meta-ethnography focuses the scope of the endeavor to reduced accounts from 
qualitative studies. It makes possible a more rigorous explanation of the relationship between 
science studies and science education so that rather than speaking in vague terms about what 
might be taken from science studies and applied to classroom teaching of science, researchers 
are able to make concrete connections between particular interpretive accounts taken from 
the two fields. This would amount to making specific links between works from the fields 
science studies and science education instead of merely making the blanket claim and 
extrapolating suggestions for practitioners of science education research and science 
educators from it. 
 The remainder of this thesis is devoted to an attempt at constructing a meta-
ethnographic synthesis of Laboratory Life and Teaching Science For Social Justice. First, the 
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organizing metaphors from each work are described and evaluated using Noblit and Hare’s 
(1989) criteria for metaphors in a qualitative study. Because the metaphors used in both 
works are a part of each study’s broader conceptualization of a practice of science, this 
evaluation of metaphors also elaborates on those conceptualizations. After evaluating the 
metaphors, their relationship across the two studies is described and a meta-ethnographic 
synthesis of the sense of the studies is attempted. Here, Kuhn’s (1989) concepts of normal 
scientific research and the eventual necessity of a paradigm shift is useful as a frame through 
which to view the specific differences in the two practices of science.  Finally, the issue of 
authenticity is revisited through the new lens provided by the synthesis and implications for 
further research are explored. 
A. Selection and Evaluation of Organizing Metaphors 
 Constructing a meta-ethnography begins with a focus on the "concepts, themes, 
organizers, and/or metaphors that the authors employ to explain what is taking place" (Noblit 
and Hare, 1989, p. 39). In the case of the two studies in question, these metaphors are related 
to each author's description of how science is practiced. There are four criteria for the 
metaphors used in a qualitative study: economy, cogency, range and apparency (Brown, 
1977, and Martin, 1975 as cited in Noblit and Hare, 1989). Economy refers to whether a 
metaphor is the simplest concept that accounts for the phenomena and is easily represented 
and manipulated. Cogency describes a metaphor's ability to explain phenomena without 
"redundancy, ambiguity, and contradiction" (p. 34).  Range refers to the power of a metaphor 
to incorporate other symbolic domains. Apparency accounts for the ability of a metaphor to 
show rather than refer to observed experience. Each of the metaphors used in both 
Laboratory Life and Teaching Science For Social Justice must be considered in light of these 
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criteria for adequacy.  
 Latour and Woolgar (1986) used six main concepts to argue that "scientific activity 
comprises the construction and sustenance of fictional accounts which are sometimes 
transformed into stabilised objects" (p. 243). For purposes of this study, these six concepts 
will be taken to be the central metaphors around which their interpretation of their laboratory 
observations revolved. The phrase, scientific activity, is taken to be analogous in sense to 
children's practice of science. The six main concepts are construction, agonistic, 
materialization/reification, credibility, circumstances and noise. The work of the laboratory is 
the construction of scientific fact which is stripped of all evidence of its construction; in the 
agonistic field successful persuasion of the reality of a scientific fact results in the belief that 
one has not been convinced at all; materialization results in the belief that material 
considerations were minor components of thought processes necessary to create the scientific 
fact, investments of credibility allow scientific fact creators to claim that the fruits of their 
labor are in no way connected to economics or beliefs, circumstances of fact construction are 
eliminated from accounts. The thrust of all of this is that the successfully constructed and 
accepted scientific fact stands alone, as a thing apart from the very world out of which it was 
created. It is made manifest in new forms of laboratory equipment and reified in the form of 
citations in publications which follow from it, though eventually a successfully constructed 
scientific fact requires no citation because all traces of authorship have been eliminated. 
 The ability to describe the metaphors in the manner above attests to their economy 
and cogency. Latour and Woolgar (1986) very clearly have an integrated scheme which 
accounts for and gives some meaning to the phenomena they observed. The incorporation of 
the economic notion of credit/credibility is particularly noteworthy for its range. All of the 
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metaphors appear to fulfill the requirement of apparency, though the experiences as they are 
show in Laboratory Life are interpreted in a manner that serves to undermine the mystique of 
science as it is practiced in the laboratory, something for which Latour and Woolgar have 
been criticized (Slezak, 1994b). 
Barton (2003) describes "a practice of science" (p. 36) to suggest "a vision of science 
education for which we might strive if we are to refocus our efforts in understanding youth 
lives and youth engagement with science" (p. 34).  It allows for a focus on how and why 
urban youth engage in science across domains in their lives, a way to make sense of how and 
why that engagement changes and it deemphasizes "what youth know and can do" (p. 34)  
instead emphasizing "how youth use what they know and can do to act on and within the 
various domains that make up their lives" (p. 34) in order to understand the forms, 
importance and uses of science in youth lives. This practice of science draws on critical 
literacy studies, social studies of science and situated cognition.  
 Barton (2003) criticizes current science literacy and reform efforts for their failure to 
address the science education requirements of youth "whose uses for and production of 
science might be vastly different from our own or from those documented and described in 
policy initiatives and national frameworks" (p. 35).  By critically reshaping the nature of 
science to fit the lives of the children she studies in Teaching Science for Social Justice,
Barton is giving the compelling arguments made in science studies short shrift. She is 
focused on the authentic, here meant as student and context specific, questions on which 
inquiry science learning focuses, while neglecting the possibility that the work in which the 
children participate might also be richly authentic in its similarity to the practice of 
professional scientists.  Using meta-ethnography as a framework for synthesis, this study will 
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attempt to show that social studies of science and the practice of science Barton frames are 
more commensurable than she has allowed by extending her argument to include this second 
form of authenticity. 
 Latour and Woolgar's (1986) study reflects on a practice of science that might be 
considered normal science, the explication and extension of a paradigm (Kuhn, 1996). It 
lacks a critical agenda, save for the determination that science might be considered to be a 
human construction rather than the reading of the book of nature. Barton's (2003) work is at 
once a critique of school science and an attempt to integrate social studies of science with 
critical literacy studies and situated cognition. In using the framework of a practice of science 
she appears to indicate that the same framework could be applied to anyone doing science in 
any context, though in the case of her study the purposes of youth’s practice of science are 
particular to their life circumstances. For this reason, Barton's explication of practice is 
somewhat problematic. For the students she worked with, the construction of a practice of 
science was not one that had a set definition of practice or of science. Rather, the practice of 
science is a metaphor for what students believe science to be, why they participate in 
"science events" (p. 36), how the youth participate in science and what meaning they bring to 
the actions in which they engage in doing science. For Barton's students, the practice of 
science is framed as a way into authorship despite their minimal or non-participation in the 
traditionally conceived vehicle for admission into a community of scientific practice, the 
science classroom. 
 The key organizers in Barton’s (2003) account of a practice of science do not 
constitute the practice itself. Instead, they describe “the terrain that allows their practices to 
grow and thrive” (p. 43). This helps to illuminate their adequacy with respect to range and 
15
apparency. Because they establish “terrain”, Barton’s organizers describe youth’s practice of 
science in terms that both incorporate other symbolic domains and by doing so “use language 
to show rather than refer to experience” (Noblit and Hare, 1988, p. 34). There are no clear 
problems with the cogency of Barton’s key organizers, as they are all easily integrated into 
the account. However, their economy is debatable. This is particularly true of “power and co-
opting science spaces” (p.67) and “relevant science: activating resources in non-standard 
ways” (p. 103). Both of these organizing metaphors are two-fold yet are capable of forming 
four organizing metaphors sufficiently complex to stand alone. The argument for maintaining 
the structure Barton uses might be that both metaphors consist of ends (power and relevant 
science) and means to those ends (co-opting science spaces and activating resources in non-
standard ways). The incorporation of means and ends in single organizing metaphors points 
to the fact that these might not be the simplest concepts to account for the phenomena (Noblit 
and Hare, 1988).  
B. Points of Intersection Between The Two Studies 
Latour and Woolgar's (1986) study focused on the work of scientists in an 
endocrinology lab as they establish the existence, structure and function of Thyrotropin 
Releasing Factor (Hormone). They interpret the work of the scientists as "the construction of 
scientific facts" via a "process of literary inscription" (p. 45). This "process of literary 
inscription" (p. 45) produces "statements" (p. 236) which take the form of papers and journal 
articles as well as conversations among scientists in the laboratory itself. Those statements 
are posited in an "agonistic field, " (p. 237) where they are operated upon. There, scientists 
add and subtract "modalities" (p. 77) to the statements which affirm or deny their relative 
validity among competing statements. A statement that has no modalities is considered to be 
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an undisputed scientific fact. Those facts are assembled in an effort to construct reality, 
which Latour and Woolgar argue is a consequence of dispute settlement rather than being its 
cause. That is, when scientists stop arguing, reality can be said to have some sort of agreed 
upon existence among them. This stands in opposition to a notion of scientists working to 
uncover or discover a preexisting reality, which when discovered will silence the arguments 
of critics. Once a statement moves out of the agonistic field, it may take the shape of an 
object or apparatus via "materialization/reification," (p. 238) the incorporation of intellectual 
components/statements into such an apparatus. Scientists gain "credibility" (p. 194) via 
"cycles of credit," (p. 192) both economically and socially. Credibility is gained through the 
successful work of literary inscription, then reinvested to obtain new, better inscription 
devices to produce more inscriptions, statements and articles in order to advance scientists' 
individual careers. The work that scientists do and its products are "entirely fabricated out of 
circumstance” (p. 239) which take the form of "networks” (p. 183) or "positions” (p. 210) 
depending on the perspective of the observer.  
 The youth in Barton's (2003) study construct a practice of science in order to 
negotiate power relationships. By "co-opting science spaces" (p. 68) youth were "disrupting 
structures and identities" (p. 88) through their participation in science, which allowed them to 
"reposition themselves with respect to authority and take control over the spaces in which 
science learning happened in their lives" (p. 88) Their practice of science was mediated by 
the "activation of resources in non-standard ways” (p. 98) which allowed children to 
construct "relevant science" (p. 103). In order to make science relevant, youth enacted 
"transformations" (p. 120) of science and of their own communities. By co-opting science 
spaces, activating resources in non-standard ways to construct relevant science, and enacting 
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transformations both of science and the communities in which they lived, youth were 
creating a "community" (p. 153) that "reflected the kind of supportive structures, 
relationships and resources that sustained their practice of science” (p. 161). Those 
communities were determinate in terms of what science got done by the youth and why, as 
well as where.  
 In describing two practices of science, both studies appear to have metaphors related 
to where science is practiced (location metaphors), how it is done (methods metaphors), why 
it is done (purpose metaphors), and why it continues to be done (perpetuation metaphors.) 
Table 2.1 identifies the major metaphors in each broader category. 
Table 2.1 
Metaphors for Practice of Science Synthesis 
 Latour and Woolgar (1986)  Barton (2003) 
location  “agonistic field” (p. 237)   “science events” (p. 36) 
 “circumstances” (p. 239)   “science spaces” (p. 38) 
methods "literary inscription" (p. 45)  "activation of resources in 
 "operations on statements" (p. 133)  non-standard ways" (p. 98) 
 "use of credit" (p. 192) 
 
purpose "solidification into fact" (p. 76)   "transforming community”(p. 120)  
 "gaining credit" (p. 192)   "disrupting identities” (p. 88) 
 
perpetuation "creation of order from disorder" (p. 245) "community" (p. 153) 
 
Because of the differences in position between the two sets of practitioners, neither 
18
set of metaphors is more adequate than the other for explaining the phenomenon. The 
scientists in Laboratory Life (1986) conducted research for purposes of career advancement 
through the construction of scientific fact. Their interests were focused on this form of 
individual advancement. The authenticity of the problems the youth in Teaching Science For 
Social Justice (2003) constructed were a comparable source of their interest in their work. 
Barton (2003) explains that youth constructed a practice of science both as a means to 
negotiate the imbalances in power relationships which they encountered in their day to day 
lives and to improve the material and social aspects of the communities in which they lived. 
The youth in Teaching Science For Social Justice (2003) are compelled to do this for reasons 
not dissimilar to the reasons for a scientific paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996). Differences 
between successive paradigms are both substantive with respect to nature and reflective of 
the science that produced each one. As Kuhn says, “They are the source of the methods, 
problem-field, and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any 
given time” (p. 103). Considering youths’ practice of science to be mature is somewhat 
problematic. However, the inability of school science to accommodate methods, a problem-
field and standards of solution appropriate to their lives leaves many of the youth in Barton 
(2003) with no other choice than to embrace the opportunity to create their own scientific 
community for the reasons Barton describes. Their methods, particularly their disruption of 
structures and identities and mobilization of resources in non-standard ways reflect the 
impositions their status as children who are homeless creates. Their problem-field is not a 
factor of the work of other scientists as described in textbooks and journal articles, but rather 
their own concern for their living space and the community which occupies it. The scientists 
of laboratory life are motivated not so much out of a concern for the space in which they 
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work and the community of practice they share as they are constrained by it. They, too, have 
a problem field that is in many ways a factor of their material circumstances, in particular the 
apparatuses available for their work and their community as it expresses itself through 
research reports. Finally, the children’s standards of solution are less formal than those of a 
professional scientist, but are appropriate to their problem-field, which again is determined 
by their material and social circumstances. The youth are not necessarily creating a new 
scientific paradigm, but they are creating a practice of science which fits some of Kuhn’s 
criteria for one. 
 This stands in stark contrast to the normal scientific work of the endocrinologists of 
Laboratory Life (1986). While their work is specific to their lab, their methods, problem-field 
and standards of solution are wholly determined by their membership in the community of 
professional scientists. They are not creating a practice of science so much as they acting in 
accordance with the shared norms and beliefs of the culture to which they already have 
membership. Their work is a validation of their status as members of the community of 
professional scientists rather than an effort to forge such a community. In the case of 
professional scientists, the community precedes the practice, while in the case of the youth, 
the practice is for the sake of the creation of a more inclusive community and as an 
expression of their concern for the broader shelter community of which they are a part. In 
both cases, the knowledge produced is affected by the position of the practitioner with 
respect to one or more communities. 
 
C. Synthetic Statement of the two studies together 
 The close examination of these two studies reveals that scientific knowledge is 
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produced through practice in the context of conflict and is the manifestation of a desire for 
authorship. Both the nature of the conflict through which knowledge is produced and the 
final products that result from the desire for authorship are the result of the position each 
group of scientists occupies with relation to the knowledge they produce. The metaphors in 
both studies locate and justify the conflict and resulting authorship by describing where 
science gets done, how it is done, for what purposes it is done and why it is perpetuated.  In 
the case of the scientists in Latour and Woolgar's (1986) study, the conflict was internecine 
and intended to minimize the impression of authorship in the articulation of scientific fact. 
Barton's (2003) youth were in conflict with a larger system of institutional forces intended to 
serve their needs, but which instead often alienated or dehumanized them. They created their 
practice of science as a means to counteract that alienation and dehumanization. 
 While both sets of metaphors appear to produce adequate summaries of the two cases, 
neither set appears superior to the other because of some significant differences between the 
subjects. Initially, those differences led to a concern that the two studies were entirely too 
disparate to merit comparison. However, the elaboration of the metaphors helps to establish a 
connection between the two studies that is not vague and simply topical. Another concern, 
particular to this study, was a resistance to the notion that the science that youth practice 
ought somehow to be a less sophisticated version of that done by scientists. Privileging the 
account of the professional practice of science might reinforce this idea. Because of this 
concern, the general categories into which both sets of metaphors were synthesized were 
more influenced by the structure of Teaching Science For Social Justice (2003), inasmuch as 
the translation began with the metaphors from that account and sought to relate the 
metaphors from Laboratory Life (1986) to them first, then deriving the converse relationship 
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from what the first revealed.   
 The notion that scientific practice sometimes results in conflict is not novel. Kuhn 
(1996) describes conflict on a large scale as well elaborated paradigms eventually raise 
questions which they are incapable of answering and are eventually supplanted by new 
paradigms which accommodate the answers to those questions. The nature of the scientific 
conflict in both Latour and Woolgar (1989) and Barton (2003) is more local and particular. It 
is not the result of unanswerable questions, but rather the relationship between those people 
practicing science and the knowledge they mobilize and produce via that practice.  Moreover, 
the conflict itself is constitutive of each group's practice of science in a way that Kuhn's 
normal science as an elaboration and extension of a paradigm is not.  For youth, the conflict 
that gave rise to their practice of science was the product of their school and shelter 
environment, both of which marginalized them. They "co-opted science spaces" in order to 
alter the boundaries that existed as a result of the policies and procedures of their schools and 
shelters. They also acted to transform their community through their practice of science. In 
particular, the youth included as many people as possible in their practice of science and 
shared the fruits of that practice with the adult residents of their shelters thus transforming 
the community notions of who can do science. Materially, they worked to transform the 
urban environment in which they lived by cleaning and converting a nearby vacant lot into a 
usable community space. 
 In a similar vein, the scientists of Laboratory Life (1986) operated in a sort of virtual 
space, the agonistic field. The conflict which took place in that field revolved around the 
addition and subtraction of modalities to statements of fact, the success of which determined 
their future participation as practitioners of science. The conflicts engendered by their 
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operations on statements eventually were materialized or reified in the form of new 
laboratory apparatuses and procedures, both of which served to transform the physical space 
in which the scientists work. The fruits of their practice were more often than not shared 
within their professional community of practice through journal articles and papers. 
Occasionally they shared their statements of fact with the broader, non-professional 
community through articles in lay publications. Those articles served primarily to increase 
their credibility, particularly their access to financial resources/credit. 
D. Authenticity Revisited 
The above synthesis engages both science education’s concept of authenticity as an  
inquiry driven practice of science deriving its focus from the positionality of the inquirers 
and as a practice of science similar to that of professionals. In fact, what becomes clear is that 
the latter form of authenticity is achieved, in part, through the former. That is, both the 
professional scientists in Laboratory Life (1986) and the children in Teaching Science For 
Social Justice (2003) create their respective practices of science in light of their material and 
social circumstances. The children are authentically practicing science by virtue of the fact 
that they not only engage in the processes of inquiry articulated in reform documents such as 
the National Science Education Standards (1996), but also because their practice shares its 
origin in a kind of conflict and a desire for authorship.  
 This shared desire for authorship presents a possible third type of authenticity for 
consideration. As interpreted by Latour and Woolgar (1986), the scientific fact derives its 
validity from the removal of “modalities,” or traces of authorship and interpretation. 
Statements capable of standing alone without modalities appear stronger than statements with 
multiple qualifiers attached to them. Thus, while a research paper bears the names of its 
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authors, those scientific findings which become facts that are taken for granted often do not. 
This seems inauthentic inasmuch as it is a denial of the material and social origins of 
scientific statements, in essence a form of dishonesty. Here, perhaps the children, whose 
work often intentionally bears the marks of its authors, are more authentic in their practice of 
science than professional scientists themselves. They are honest about the origins of their 
work.  
E. Conclusions 
 Some science education researchers view science studies as a means to humanizing 
the practice of science by giving science educators and their students a more accurate image 
of the work of professional scientists. This serves as a form of demystification, eliminating 
the image of the solitary scientist emerging from his lab with a great discovery to share with 
the rest of humanity. An alternative image science studies portray is that of scientific 
knowledge as hard won, not through conflict with an untamed natural world but through 
conflict and cooperation among practitioners. However, that scientific knowledge held to be 
factual is beyond reproach, in part, because all elements of that conflict and cooperation have 
been removed. In other words, scientific fact is dehumanized through the removal of the 
evidence of its construction by human hands. Such scientific fact is further removed from the 
human hands that constructed it through materialization/reification as laboratory apparatus. 
Each laboratory apparatus began as a literary inscription subject to debate among scientists in 
a larger agonistic field of their practice.  
 Those very students who might benefit most from a demystified vision of science 
viewed through the various lenses of science studies are often themselves dehumanized 
socially and economically by institutions designed both to make their education possible and 
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to further it. One response to this dehumanization is to actualize themselves via a practice of 
science. They find ways "to make their lives science" (Barton, 2003, p.163) in order to 
transform the world in which they live and to leave evidence of the human hands which 
effect that transformation.  
 Those researchers who hope to establish a relationship between science studies and 
science education for purposes of improving the access of diverse student populations to 
scientific knowledge and practice would do well to consider if there is a critical tradition in 
science studies that addresses how the relationship between scientific practitioners and the 
knowledge they draw upon, and produce, influences the nature of their work. As people 
intellectually positioned on the inside by virtue of their advanced degrees and specialized 
skills, it is interesting that they devote so much effort to anonymous, but seemingly universal 
statements about the natural world.  
 At the same time, researchers hoping to establish such a relationship would also do 
well to consider the interpretive nature of their endeavor. The description of particular 
practices of science holds more promise than attempts to enumerate its general attributes. It 
requires the admission that much of knowing is a matter of translating observed phenomena 
into terms that hold meaning for the translator, essentially making meaning of the world as it 
is observed. For purposes of acting in that world, synthesis of diverse accounts of that 
meaning making is useful for a number of reasons related to policymaking, improving 
practice and generally enhancing human discourse. Because science studies and critical 
ethnography, the fields from which Laboratory Life and Teaching Science For Social Justice 
respectively emerge, are explicitly interpretive, the aggregate logic of literature reviews does 
damage to the quality of their interpretations. Meta-ethnography holds promise as a means to 
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synthesize interpretive research for the purpose of illuminating the larger-scale relationship 
between science studies and science education.  It has already found some use informing the 
practice of health-related professions such as nursing (Thorne, et al., 2004). 
The synthesis of these two studies makes clear that while professional scientists and 
youth who practice science share an interest in authorship and forge that authorship amidst 
conflict, their purposes in doing so reflect their unique positionalities. At the same time, the 
synthesis reveals that youth may develop a practice of science in a resourceful and relevant 
manner, but an interest in transforming their communities for the better through material 
improvement and increased inclusiveness is what perpetuates that practice. This stands 
somewhat in contrast to Latour and Woolgar's (1986) professional scientists, whose work is 
perpetuated in the interest of gaining credit and advancing careers, with the creation of order 
from disorder as a by product of their ability to impose their statements on others.  
 Within the field of science education, this synthesis is also an attempt to engage in the 
ongoing dialogue with science studies in a new, more paradigmatically appropriate manner. 
A synthesis such as this requires a closer examination of a smaller number of interpretive 
studies than a large scale meta-analysis of quantitative data or a review of qualitative 
literature. At the same time, the insights a meta-ethnography yields are philosophically and 
methodologically sound, rather than the product of an academic ritual such as the literature 
review. While demonstrating a grasp of the research regarding particular topics is valuable 
and demonstrable through a literature review, it can devolve into a topically organized list of 
strengths and weaknesses of prior research rather than a synthetic statement. Meta-
ethnography is intended as a response to the aggregate view of knowledge inherent in the list 
of strengths and weaknesses and holds the potential to illuminate the nature of science by 
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treating in a more interpretively appropriate and case-specific manner. 
 This particular synthesis highlights the relationship between laboratory science and a 
practice of science outside of schools. This is somewhat unique in the attempts that have 
been made to link science studies and science education, which have focused on ways to 
make classroom practice more authentic. That objective might be achieved through a closer 
examination of the practices of science constructed by youth for whom school science has 
not worked, and its relationship to the images of science provided by science studies. Future 
meta-ethnographies might incorporate accounts of classroom practices of science as well as 
accounts of field sciences. Doing so might reveal that the relationship between traditional 
laboratory sciences and school science differs from that of field sciences and school science.  
 More broadly, meta-ethnography might provide a more thorough elaboration of the 
range of meanings of authenticity in science education. Other qualitative studies might yield 
metaphors which, when synthesized, are more commensurable than those used here. Other 
forms of authenticity might be described by such syntheses necessitating the reconsideration 
of other issues within science education upon which multiple notions of authenticity might be 
brought to bear. An authentic practice of science which embraces a multifaceted notion of 
authenticity requires a reexamination of the nature of science and the forms of scientific 
literacy required for participation as well. Such reconsiderations could serve as a further 
impetus to changes in classroom practice, particularly increased inclusiveness. 
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